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UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES: PADILLA v. 
KENTUCKY STILL EXCUSES FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS AND LEAVES PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY LOST 
Maurice Hew, Jr.* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky includes 
within the Sixth Amendment’s right to the effective assistance of counsel 
advice on immigration, but still falls short of attaining fundamental fair-
ness and legal professional responsibility. Where Padilla’s recognized rep-
resentation standard only requires an attorney to advise when the immi-
gration consequences of a guilty plea are “truly clear” —allowing the 
attorney to “do no more” when not clear—the guiding hand of an attor-
ney remains fractured and will force a noncitizen client to proceed in 
plea bargaining without informed consent. Rather than giving a private 
practitioner an excuse to “do no more,” the private practitioner should 
simply study and provide the applicable immigration law under the cir-
cumstances. A public defender not knowledgeable in immigration law, 
however, should be allowed to do no more based on their uncontrollable 
caseload, provided an immigration lawyer is also appointed. 
Courts are almost universally in agreement that an assertion of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel will prevail only where the trial representation was so in-
adequate as to amount to no counsel at all and the trial was reduced to a 
sham and a mockery of justice. 
—State v. Cathey1 
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Introduction 
 In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel requires 
lawyers to inform their clients of pertinent and potential immigration 
consequences regarding criminal convictions.2 As a result, the Court 
raised the constitutional attorney performance standards to meet the 
prevailing norms of attorney practice that, since the mid-1990s, requires 
criminal defense attorneys to advise clients of deportation risks.3 The 
scope of Padilla’s attorney performance mandate, however, is limited to 
situations where pertinent immigration consequences are “truly clear.”4 
Where immigration laws are not truly clear, counsel must, at a mini-
mum, “do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending crimi-
nal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”5 
 While the Padilla decision is a step forward for immigration rights 
advocates, its “vague half-way test” still allows for unsatisfactory perform-
ance by attorneys unfamiliar with—or perhaps unwilling to learn— im-
migration law.6 Padilla is a mere application of Strickland v. Washington, 
which holds attorneys to an objective standard of reasonableness, and 
                                                                                                                      
2 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in 
which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. The Sixth Amendment 
reads in full: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence. 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
3 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at. 1485–86 (“For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have 
generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation conse-
quences of a client’s plea.”); see Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance 
of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 699 (2002) (over 
thirty states and eleven circuit court decisions had all held that there was no constitutional 
duty to inform of collateral consequences); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
688–89 (1984) (“Any such set of rules [regarding counsel’s conduct] would interfere with 
the constitutionally protected independence of counsel . . . .”). 
4 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
5 Id. (emphasis added). 
6 See id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669–70. Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, refers to the majority’s truly-
clear test as a “vague, half-way test.” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487. It is important to note that 
this article considers the “stricter rules of practice” substantially similar to the rules of pro-
fessional responsibility, including but not limited to the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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not an adoption of the American Bar Association’s (ABA) more compel-
ling Rules of Professional Responsibility.7 As such, Padilla’s disjointed 
attorney performance standard may leave uncertainties for noncitizen 
clients making the crucial decision of whether to plead guilty.8 
 Padilla’s truly-clear test for reasonable attorney performance will 
likely foster further immigration misadvice or incomplete advice by pub-
lic defenders who are not necessarily familiar with immigration law but 
are expected by courts to advise clients on the immigration-related con-
sequences of a conviction.9 There is also a continuing danger of private 
or appointed attorneys decidedly doing no more—or opting out of 
competence—because the effects of certain immigration laws are not 
truly clear.10 When private attorneys are unwilling to effectively inform 
clients of potential immigration-related consequences of a criminal con-
viction—and public defenders do not have the resources to appropri-
ately do so—Padilla disadvantages clients, still erroneously excuses fun-
damental fairness, and leaves professional responsibility lost.11 
 Using Padilla as a backdrop, this Article critically analyzes compe-
tent representation of aliens in criminal proceedings.12 In Part I, this 
Article presents the Padilla decision and a brief case history, including 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s attorney 
                                                                                                                      
7 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1476; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. 
8 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (explaining that when the law is not truly clear, “a crimi-
nal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending crimi-
nal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences”). 
9 Private and court appointed attorneys are distinguished from public defenders, as the 
latter are precluded from the private practice of law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(A) 
(2006). See Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218, 219, 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that, 
even though an attorney erroneously advised his client to plead to the reduced charge of 
possession of drug paraphernalia as opposed to the possession of marijuana, the defendant’s 
guilty plea “assumed the risk of deportation”); Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (making deportable any noncitizen convicted under any law re-
lated to a controlled substance with the exception of a single offense of possession of thirty 
grams or less of marijuana); see also Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Ken-
tucky? Thoughts on Implementation and Future Directions, 45 New Eng. L. Rev. 353, 357 (2011) 
(“Given the previously unrecognized constitutional duty of criminal defense counsel to advise 
about immigration consequences and the fact that most criminal defense attorneys are not 
familiar with immigration law, it is clear that there is a very large educational task ahead as a 
result of Padilla.”). 
10 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
11 See id. 
12 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2011) (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). Though the 
term alien is derogatory, it is defined in the INA as “any person not a citizen or national of 
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). 
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performance standards as established in Strickland. Part II moves from 
the constitutional standards of attorney performance to the prevailing 
professional norms of practice, insofar as they are articulated by the 
ABA Rules of Professional Responsibility. This part uses the facts from 
Padilla to establish the level of advice for immigration removal and re-
lief that should be expected of competent criminal counsel under the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This analysis demonstrates 
that the potential for deportation in Padilla’s case was not “truly clear” 
because one needs to do more than read the text of the immigration 
statute to establish whether a guilty plea would result in removal. 
 Finally, Part III addresses the Padilla majority’s truly-clear standard 
with criticism and suggests an alternative, bifurcated attorney perform-
ance test in an effort to provide a workable solution that preserves fun-
damental fairness for clients and encourages professional responsibility 
for lawyers. This part argues that the Supreme Court should have bifur-
cated its analysis, separating the standards of professional conduct ex-
pected of public defenders from those of private or appointed attorneys. 
I. Strickland Applies to Padilla’s Claim 
 In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court applied the Strickland v. 
Washington attorney performance test.13 The Padilla Court held that 
immigration advice is not collaterally or categorically excluded from 
the ambit of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel.14 In Strickland, the Supreme Court clarified that counsel is in-
effective if two requirements are met: (1) performance deficiency and 
(2) prejudice.15 In its decision, the Padilla Court clarified the three 
competing approaches used to determine whether the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel applied to an attorney’s 
advice concerning immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, 
rejecting them and implementing the truly-clear standard.16 
                                                                                                                      
13 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
14 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Commonwealth v. Padilla, 
253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008), reversed and remanded sub nom. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. 
Ct. 1473 (2010). 
15 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
16 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–84; Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5–7, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (No. 08-651); 
Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1393, 1397 (2011); 
Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1299, 1303–04 (2011); 
infra notes 41–50 and accompanying text. 
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A. Background: Padilla v. Kentucky 
 Jose Padilla was born in Honduras and was a legal permanent resi-
dent alien of the United States for over forty years before his arrest.17 
He arrived in the United States in the 1960s and later honorably served 
the U.S. military in Vietnam.18 Prior to his arrest, Padilla lived in La 
Puente, California with his family.19 He worked as a commercial truck 
driver under a Nevada commercial driver’s license.20 In 2001, law en-
forcement officers at a Kentucky weigh station stopped Padilla for not 
having a weight and distance number on his truck.21 He consented to a 
search of the truck and officers found approximately one thousand 
pounds of marijuana.22 
 In October of 2001, a Hardin County, Kentucky grand jury indicted 
Padilla for misdemeanor possession of marijuana, misdemeanor posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia, felony trafficking in marijuana, and failing 
to have a weight and distance tax number on his truck.23 He subse-
                                                                                                                      
 
17 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2006) (defining the term 
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence” as “the status of having been lawfully ac-
corded the privilege of residing permanently in the United Sates as an immigrant in ac-
cordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed”). Also, it should be 
noted that the Jose Padilla involved in this case is not the same as the enemy combatant in 
the 2004 Supreme Court decision of Rumsfeld v. Padilla. 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
18See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477. 
19 Joint Appendix at 77, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651). 
20 Id. at 79. 
21 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 2, Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651). 
22 Brown, supra note 16, at 1400. 
23 Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 48–49; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.1421–218A.1422 
(LexisNexis 2002) (“A person is guilty of possession of marijuana when he or she knowingly 
and unlawfully possesses marijuana . . . . Possession of marijuana is a Class A misde-
meanor.”). The Kentucky statute for possession of drug paraphernalia reads in part: 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with the intent to use, 
drug paraphernalia for the purpose of planting, propagating, cultivating, 
growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, 
processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packing, repacking, storing, con-
taining, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing 
into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter . . . . 
 . . . . 
(5) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.500. The Kentucky statute regarding operating without a weight 
and distance tax number reads: 
With respect to KRS 138.655 to 138.725, it is unlawful for any person to: 
(1) Fail to pay the tax imposed; 
36 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:31 
quently pled guilty to felony trafficking, relying on the advice of his at-
torney that he would not be deported from the United States because 
“he had been in the country so long.”24 While serving his sentence for 
marijuana trafficking, officials placed Padilla in removal proceedings 
based on his criminal conviction, which is categorized as an aggravated 
felony under the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).25 In turn, Padilla filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Ken-
tucky state court, alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney misadvised him of 
the potential immigration consequences of his guilty plea.26 He further 
alleged that, had he known the certainty of his deportation after the 
guilty plea, he would have insisted on going to trial.27 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that immigration 
consequences of a conviction are collateral in nature, such that advice 
concerning deportation does not fall within the ambit of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.28 On certiorari, the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that immigration advice was neither 
collateral nor categorically excluded from the ambit of the Sixth Amend-
ment.29 
B. The Strickland v. Washington Test for Attorney Performance 
 In Padilla, the Court used the familiar attorney performance test 
established in Strickland.30 In Strickland, the Supreme Court clarified 
                                                                                                                      
(2) Fail, neglect, or refuse to file any return in the manner or within the time 
required; 
(3) Make any false statement or conceal any material fact in any record, re-
turn, or affidavit; 
(4) Conduct any activities requiring a license without such license or after 
such license has been surrendered, canceled or revoked; 
(5) Assign or attempt to assign a license; or 
(6) Violate any other provisions. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 138.720. 
24 Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 80 (quoting a pro se petition by Padilla written 
during his imprisonment). Padilla, in addition to pleading to felony trafficking, pled guilty 
to possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 54. 
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006); Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 54, 80. 
Among other punishments, Padilla was sentenced to serve ten years in jail with five years 
probation. See Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 54. 
26 Brief of Petitioner at 11, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651). 
27 Id. 
28 See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485. 
29 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1482, 1486; see U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
30 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
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that counsel is ineffective if two requirements are met: (1) perform-
ance deficiency and (2) prejudice.31 The Court stated: 
In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the perform-
ance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reason-
able considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of 
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards 
and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reason-
able, but they are only guides. No particular set of detailed 
rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of 
the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the 
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent 
a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere 
with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel 
and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making 
tactical decisions. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines 
for representation could distract counsel from the overriding 
mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause. More-
over, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the 
Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal repre-
sentation, although that is a goal of considerable importance 
to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 
 Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential.32 
Thus, the Strickland constitutional standard for professional responsibil-
ity is simply what is reasonable under the circumstances, and not strict 
adherence to the ABA guidelines.33 
 In Bobby v. Van Hook, the Supreme Court affirmed the reasonable-
under-the-circumstances test, holding it inappropriate to rely on the 
ABA guidelines “as inexorable commands with which all capital defense 
counsel must fully comply.”34 The Court stated that, “‘[w]hile states are 
free to impose whatever specific rules they see fit to ensure that crimi-
nal defendants are well represented, we have held that the Federal 
                                                                                                                      
31 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
32 Id. at 688–89 (internal citations omitted). 
33 See id.; Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2008), vacated 130 
S. Ct. 2340 (2010) (citing United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1994)) (“We 
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient by measuring it against an ‘objec-
tive standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’”). 
34 130 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). 
38 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:31 
Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make ob-
jectively reasonable choices.’”35 Expanding on Strickland in Hill v. Lock-
hart, the Supreme Court held that the Strickland performance test also 
applies to advice provided during plea agreements.36 
 The Padilla majority applied Strickland, addressing its performance 
prong and holding Padilla’s representation constitutionally deficient for 
his attorney’s misadvice as to the immigration consequences of pleading 
guilty to trafficking marijuana.37 The Court specifically enunciated that 
the weight of professional norms supports the view that counsel must 
advise clients of the risks of deportation when such a consequence is 
truly clear after examining the relevant immigration statute.38 When the 
consequences are not truly clear and the potential for deportation is not 
easily gleaned from the statute, however, “a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal 
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”39 
C. Pre-Padilla Standards Rejected 
 Prior to Padilla, courts had developed three general approaches for 
determining whether the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel applied to an attorney’s advice concerning the immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction.40 The first approach is that of 
the Kentucky Supreme Court and echoed by Justice Scalia in his dissent 
in Padilla. 41  The Kentucky Supreme Court explained that the Sixth 
                                                                                                                      
 
35 Id. (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000)). 
36 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); see Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, at 697 (“Because over 
ninety percent of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas, perhaps the most important 
service criminal defense lawyers perform is advising their clients whether to plead guilty 
and on what terms.”). 
37 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (“Accepting his allegations as true, Padilla has sufficiently 
alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy the first prong of Strickland.”). In Padilla, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Kentucky Supreme Court to determine if 
Padilla could establish the second Strickland prong of prejudice. Id. at 1483–84. See generally 
Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 How. L.J. 693 (2011) (discussing proving 
prejudice under the second prong of Strickland after Padilla). 
38 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1484; Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pe-
titioner, supra note 16, at 6; see Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Brown, 
supra note 16, at 1397; Markowitz, supra note 16, at 1331. 
41 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1494–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated: 
I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that the Sixth Amendment requires 
counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the potential removal conse-
quences of a guilty plea. For the same reasons, but unlike the concurrence, I 
do not believe that affirmative misadvice about those consequences renders 
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Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends only to ad-
vice concerning direct consequences of a criminal conviction and not 
collateral consequences.42 Prior to Padilla, most courts considered im-
migration consequences to be collateral and wholly outside the scope of 
the Sixth Amendment.43 Justice Stevens and the Padilla majority dis-
missed this view, however, holding that “immigration advice has not 
been categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment.”44 
 The second approach, advocated by the ABA in its amicus brief, 
removes the distinction between direct and collateral consequences 
and asserts that Strickland’s standard applies to all consequences of a 
conviction.45  In this sense, the second approach follows the stricter 
guidelines of attorney performance proffered by the ABA. 46  The 
                                                                                                                      
an attorney’s assistance in defending against the prosecution constitutionally 
inadequate; or that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to warn immi-
grant defendants that a conviction may render them removable. 
Id. Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated: 
We conclude that our unequivocal holding in Fuartado leaves Appellee with-
out a remedy . . . . As collateral consequences are outside the scope of the 
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s 
failure to advise Appellee of such collateral issue or his act of advising Appel-
lee incorrectly provides no basis for relief. In neither instance is the matter 
required to be addressed by counsel, and so an attorney’s failure in that re-
gard cannot constitute ineffectiveness entitling a criminal defendant to relief 
under Strickland v. Washington. 
253 S.W.3d at 485. 
42 Id. 
43 See Santos-Sanchez, 548 F.3d at 334 (citing United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th 
Cir. 1993)) (“Defense counsel has done all he must under the Constitution when he ad-
vises his client of the direct consequences of a guilty plea.”); Chin & Holmes, supra note 3, 
at 706–08 (stating that the collateral consequences rule has been accepted by the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Co-
lumbia Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as courts in 35 states); John J. Francis, 
Failure to Advise Non-Citizens of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Should This Be 
Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 691, 710 (2003) (quoting King 
v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
44 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
45 See Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 16, at 4. 
46 Id. The ABA states in its amicus brief: 
As elaborated in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, the duties of compe-
tence and communication oblige a criminal defense lawyer to be fully in-
formed of the facts and the law, and to advise the accused with complete can-
dor concerning all aspects of the case, including a candid estimate of the 
probable outcome. 
Id. 
40 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 32:31 
Padilla majority, however, implicitly rejected this approach by reiterat-
ing that “prevailing norms of practice as reflected in the American Bar 
Association’s standards and the like . . . are guides to determining 
what is reasonable [but] . . . . are only guides . . . .”47 
                                                                                                                     
 The Kentucky Appeals Court adopted the third approach, which 
maintains the distinction between direct and collateral consequences, 
and held that Strickland does not generally apply to collateral conse-
quences but that it does apply to affirmative misrepresentations regard-
ing those consequences.48 This approach leads to an exception where 
“an affirmative act of gross misadvice relating to collateral matters can 
justify post conviction relief.”49 Justice Stevens and the Padilla majority, 
however, also dismissed this line of thinking. 50 
II. Living Up to the ABA’s Rules of Professional Responsibility 
 The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed its opposition to a 
concrete set of rules, such as the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, to serve as the constitutional standards of attorney perform-
ance.51 In part, the Court’s position is that attorneys need to be free 
from strict guidelines or limitations that might “restrict the wide lati-
tude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.”52 Indeed, “[n]o 
particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily 
take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel 
or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a 
criminal defendant.”53 Yet, when an attorney makes the purposeful de-
cision to undertake a “cr-immigration” representation—a criminal case 
 
47 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
48 See Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483–84. 
49 Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th 
Cir. 1988). In Padilla, both the concurring opinion and dissenting opinion agreed with the 
majority that an attorney should not be permitted to provide misadvice regarding immi-
gration consequences. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I concur in 
the judgment because a criminal defense attorney fails to provide effective assistance 
within the meaning of Strickland . . . if the attorney misleads a noncitizen client regarding 
the removal consequences of a conviction. In my view, such an attorney must . . . refrain 
from unreasonably providing incorrect advice . . . .”); Id. at 1494 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“In the best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought 
to be advised of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to 
be misadvised.”). 
50 Padilla, 130 S. Ct.  at 1484 (majority opinion). 
51See Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 688–89 (1984). 
52 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89 (citing United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 
(D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
53 Id. at 688–89. 
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with immigration consequences—counsel’s subsequent decision not to 
become familiar with the state of immigration law or failure to advise a 
noncitizen client of possible immigration consequences should not be 
considered tactical in nature.54 Rather, such unsatisfactory attorney be-
havior should be considered constitutionally deficient under the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 
 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(a) requires that a crimi-
nal defense attorney not undertake representation of a client when that 
representation creates a violation of the Model Rules or any other law.55 
The drafters of the Models Rules of Professional Conduct intentionally 
made the first rule require competent representation, including the 
“legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably nec-
essary for the representation.” 56  To fulfill the ABA competency re-
quirement, lawyers need not be familiar with every field of law perti-
nent to their client at the outset of a case, but must reasonably believe 
that they can acquire familiarity in a timely manner.57 
A. Immigration Status and Criminal History of Clients 
 In the realm of cr-immigration matters, the ABA Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility require competent representation such that crimi-
nal defense counsel should minimally determine: (1) the immigration 
status and criminal history of the client; (2) immigration ramifications 
of a proposed plea; (3) the client’s wishes and plans for the near future; 
and (4) a criminal trial strategy to meet the client’s needs.58 In satisfying 
                                                                                                                      
 
54 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration 
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367, 381 (2006); see also Car-
los Moctezuma García & César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, CrImmigration: Prac. 
Analysis Key Cases About Immigr. Consequences Crim. Violations, http://www. 
crImmigration.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2011) (using the term “crImmigration” to denote 
the intersection of criminal and immigration law). In effect, when considering the ade-
quacy of trial counsel’s investigation, courts do look to ABA standards to determine 
whether the Sixth Amendment has been satisfied. See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neu-
mann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. 
Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 
Am. J. Crim. L. 127, 129 (2007). 
55 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(a) (2011) (“Except as stated in para-
graph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, 
shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in a 
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law . . . .”). 
56 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1. 
57 Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Professional Responsibility: A 
Student’s Guide 87 (2010). 
58 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.0(e), 1.1, 1.2, 1.3; People v. Pozo, 746 
P.2d 523, 529 (Colo. 1987) (“[A]ttorneys must inform themselves of material legal princi-
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the first factor of determining immigration status and criminal history, a 
criminal attorney should not be quick to accept as true a client’s state-
ment as to his or her alien status.59 Immigrants may not be certain of 
which status they hold or may otherwise be falsely informed.60 
 Determining whether one is a United States citizen can be compli-
cated.61 Citizenship corresponds with a unique area of immigration law, 
distinct from naturalization, commonly referred to as “nationality law” 
and is not necessarily based upon where one was born.62 Under national-
ity law, these “naturally-born” individuals might unknowingly and auto-
matically become United States citizens by operation of law though sim-
ply meeting certain criteria upon or after birth.63  These criteria are 
                                                                                                                      
 
ples that may significantly impact the particular circumstances of their clients.”). This Arti-
cle does not delve into how to investigate the criminal history of clients. If a client has a 
past criminal history, it may have immigration ramifications that need to be taken into 
consideration before entering a guilty plea. For example, one is subject to removal and 
inadmissibility for multiple criminal convictions. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
59 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p) (2010).The Code of Federal Regu-
lations states: 
The term lawfully admitted for permanent residence means the status of having 
been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United 
Sates as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status 
not having changed. Such status terminates upon entry of a final administra-
tive order of exclusion, deportation, removal, or rescission. 
8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p). 
60 See Vicky J. Salinas, Comment, You Can Be Whatever You Want to Be When You Grow Up, 
Unless Your Parents Brought You to This Country Illegally: The Struggle to Grant In-State Tuition to 
Undocumented Immigrant Students, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 847, 861–62 (2006) (“Many children of 
illegal immigrants do not learn of their undocumented status until they attempt to pursue 
higher education.”). 
61 See Antonia Hernandez, Essay, American Citizenship Post 9-11, 1 Stan. J. C.R. & C. L. 
289, 290–91 (2005). 
62 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401. The citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment, codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1401(a), requires not only birth in the United States but being subject to jurisdic-
tion as well. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (“The following shall be nationals and 
citizens of the United States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof . . . .”); see James C. Ho, Defining “American”: Birthright Citizenship and 
the Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment, 9 Green Bag 367, 368–69 (2006). 
63 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (stating that “a person born outside of the United States and 
its outlying possessions of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States and one 
of whom has had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, prior 
to the birth of such person,” is a citizen of the United States). By virtue of the statute, a 
person born in a foreign country that practices ius soli citizenship—or of the soil—and 
who is issued the nationality of that county would also simultaneously acquire United 
States nationality having been born outside of the United States through the principle of 
ius sanguinis, or by descent. See id. §§ 1401(a), 1431(a); Hernandez, supra note 16, at 290–
91. Section 1431(a) of the U.S. Code, chapter eight, states: 
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largely based on actions of one’s parents or grandparents.64 Natural-born 
clients might create confusion for unfamiliar criminal defense attorneys, 
as the client will probably have a birth certificate or other documentation 
from a foreign country but not a United States birth certificate. 
 In Padilla’s case, he advised his attorney that he was a lawful per-
manent resident alien, but to confirm the factual accuracy of his asser-
tion, counsel should have obtained a copy of his alien registration 
card.65 Lawful permanent resident aliens are permitted to reside and 
work in the United States for the duration of their status.66 Neverthe-
                                                                                                                      
A child born outside of the United States automatically becomes a citizen of 
the United States when all of the following conditions have been fulfilled: 
 (1) At least one parent of the child is a citizen of the United States, 
whether by birth or naturalization. 
 (2) The child is under the age of eighteen years. 
 (3) The child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical cus-
tody of the citizen parent pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent resi-
dence. 
8 U.S.C. § 1431(a). 
64 See 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a) (2006). In the United States, parents must naturalize before 
the child is eighteen and the child does not necessarily have to perform any actions in 
order to become a United States Citizen. See id. § 1433. Some examples include: 
Case 1: Padilla might be a citizen of the United States if he was born abroad to US citi-
zen parents or if he is a lawful permanent resident Alien born to parents who naturalized 
prior to his eighteenth birthday. See id. § 1431(a). 
Case 2: If one of Padilla’s parents’ naturalized before his eighteenth birthday, he 
might also be a citizen depending on the year in which he was born. See id. § 1433. 
Case 3: If Padilla was also born out of wedlock, and considered illegitimate, to a 
United States Citizen mother, he might be a United States Citizen. See id. § 1409. 
Case 4: If Padilla’s grandparents were United States Citizens, they might be able to 
transmit their physical presence for purposes of conferring United States Citizenship upon 
Padilla. See id. § 1433. 
65 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; Green Card (Permanent Resi-
dence), U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Services (May 13, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov/green 
card. The 2008 presidential election revealed that presidential candidate and Senator John 
McCain was not born in the United States but in the country of Panama. See Carl Hulse, 
McCain’s Canal Zone Birth Prompts Queries About Whether That Rules Him Out, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
28, 2008, at A21. Theoretically, he should have a Panamanian birth certificate and should 
not be in possession of a birth certificate issued by any U.S. state. See 8 U.S.C. § 1403. Were 
McCain involved in any criminal court proceedings, his defense counsel should take note 
of his Panamanian birth certificate and investigate nationality laws. See id. 
66 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(1) (2010). “The term ‘United 
States’, except as otherwise specifically herein provided, when used in a geographical 
sense, means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Virgin Islands of the United States, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38) (Supp. 2010). 
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less, they are still subject to deportation and inadmissibility, regardless 
of how long they have resided in the United States.67 
B. Immigration Impact of the Proposed Plea 
 Under the immigration laws of the United States, an alien placed 
in removal proceedings may be charged with any applicable ground of 
inadmissibility under section 212(a) or any applicable ground of 
deportability under section 237(a) of the INA.68 Had Padilla fit within 
any of the enumerated statutory provisions, he should have been ad-
vised of the immigration consequences beyond removal.69 Moreover, 
Padilla should have been advised of potential forms of relief to over-
come any of the grounds of removal, all prior to his plea of guilt. 
1. Removal 
 After an alien client advises an attorney of an arrest, the attorney 
will need to review the grand jury indictment or bill of information to 
determine the precise charges and compare the state or federal statutes 
with immigration statutes for a categorical match to a ground of inad-
missibility, removal, or both.70 
a. Removal for Controlled Substances 
 In Padilla’s situation, the relevant immigration removal provisions 
are those concerning (1) controlled substances and (2) aggravated 
felonies. The removal statute for controlled substances provides: 
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted 
of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law 
or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign coun-
try relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 
                                                                                                                      
67 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D) (2006). Padilla was misadvised by his criminal attorney 
that he was not subject to deportation because he had been in the country for a long time. 
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
68 INA §§ 212(a), 237(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a). 
69 See id.; Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
70 See INA §§ 212, 237(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227(a); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 4–
5 (2004); Arguelles-Olivares v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 171, 180 (5th Cir. 2008) (Dennis, J., dis-
senting) (discussing “the Supreme Court’s Taylor-Shepard ‘modified categorical approach’” 
used in removal cases). The Supreme Court, in an effort to determine removal, has ac-
cepted the categorical approach of looking to the elements and the nature of the offense 
of conviction rather than particular facts relating to the petitioner’s crime in an effort to 
determine removal. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 4–5. 
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802 of title 21), other than a single offense involving posses-
sion for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is de-
portable.71 
Therefore, to be subject to removal, one must be: (1) an alien; (2) ad-
mitted; (3) convicted in a State, the United States, or a foreign country; 
and (4) convicted on charges relating to a controlled substance other 
than a single offense involving possession for one’s own personal use of 
thirty grams or less of marijuana.72 The term “conviction,” as used in 
the INA, has an independent meaning from that used in state law.73 For 
example, in Massachusetts, a continuation of a defendant’s case with-
out a finding of guilt is a conviction for immigration purposes and, in 
Texas, a deferred adjudication would also count as a conviction, regard-
less of the state’s intentions.74 
                                                                                                                      
 
71 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
72 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). “Admitted” is a term of art that is specifically defined by stat-
ute. See id. § 1101(a)(13). While the administrative immigration courts have traditionally 
categorized the term adjustment as an admission, the United States Courts of Appeal for 
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have distinguished the two terms. See Lanier v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1366–67 (11th Cir. 2011); Bianco v. Holder, 624 F.3d 265, 267 (5th 
Cir. 2010); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 542–43 (5th Cir. 2008). This distinction is 
significant. See Martinez, 519 F.3d at 542–43. Arguably, where an alien has adjusted status 
and is subsequently convicted of a controlled substance offense, the alien could fall out-
side of this removal statute, as the alien was never admitted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a); Lanier, 
631 F.3d at 1366; Martinez, 519 F.3d at 542–43. 
73 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006); see, e.g., De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 
(1st Cir. 2007) (finding that a continuation of a defendant’s case without a finding of guilt 
is a conviction for immigration purposes); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1006 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that a deferred adjudication is a conviction, regardless of the state’s intentions). 
The statute defining the term “conviction” reads: 
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of 
guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been with-
held, where— 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding 
of guilt, and 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on 
the alien’s liberty to be imposed. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 
74 De Vega, 503 F.3d at 49; Moosa, 171 F.3d at 1006. One should also tread carefully 
when interpreting the phrase “relating to.” Here, the statute mandates that the conviction 
be relating to a controlled substance, as defined under federal law. See Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonza-
les, 473 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gameros-Hernandez v. INS, 883 F.2d 839, 
841 (9th Cir. 1989)) (“The government must prove by ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence that the facts alleged as grounds of [removability] are true.’”). Courts have de-
fined “relating to” broadly, such that a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia in 
itself equates to the controlled substance conviction needed for removal under several 
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b. Removal for Aggravated Felonies 
 While an alien may fall into a class subject to removal for a con-
trolled substance conviction, that alien might also be subject to other 
statutory grounds for removal.75 Under the INA, “an alien convicted of 
an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”76 “Ag-
gravated felony,” a term of art used in the INA,  is defined in part as 
“illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . , including a drug traf-
ficking crime . . . .”77 
 In Garcia-Echaverria v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held that a 
Kentucky conviction for the offense of trafficking marijuana weighing 
between eight ounces and five pounds was an aggravated felony within 
the meaning of the INA.78 Likewise, Padilla’s Kentucky indictment re-
veals that officers arrested him for trafficking marijuana, a Class C fel-
ony, in excess of five pounds. Therefore, because Padilla’s trafficking 
charges involved more marijuana than in Garcia-Echaverria, prosecutors 
would likely charge him with an aggravated felony, too. 
 Additionally, the Act narrowly interprets the term “illicit traffick-
ing.”79 Thus, where a state statute broadly defines that term, an indi-
vidual’s state conviction for illicit trafficking may not qualify him or her 
as an aggravated felon under the INA.80 
                                                                                                                      
courts’ interpretations of this statute. See Hussein v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 413 F. App’x 
431, 432–33 (3d Cir. 2010); Bermudez v. Holder, 586 F.3d 1167, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Barraza v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 388, 392 (7th Cir. 2008). In the instant matter, Padilla’s drug 
paraphernalia offense more than likely related to a controlled substance because the 
grand jury named marijuana, a controlled substance under federal law, in its indictment. 
See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 48. Under the removal 
statute for controlled substances, however, a conviction for personal use of thirty grams or 
less of marijuana does not fall within the statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
75 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
76 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
77 Id. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
78 Garcia-Echaverria v. United States, 376 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 2004). 
79 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006); United States v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 712, 716 
(5th Cir. 2007). 
80See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B); see, e.g., Gonzales, 484 F.3d at 716. In United States v. 
Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit held that a Texas conviction for delivery of a controlled sub-
stance did not meet the definition of a drug trafficking crime for criminal sentence en-
hancement purposes. 484 F.3d at 716. The Texas statute for delivery of a controlled sub-
stance included the term “offering to sell,” which was not an element of the federal drug 
trafficking offense. Id. at 714–15. As such, the court deemed the state statute broader than 
the federal statute and it did not consider the petitioner an aggravated felon for the mere 
offer to sell. See id. While Padilla should have tried to avoid a plea to distribution of mari-
juana, likely making him an aggravated felon for immigration purposes, the law is not 
always as clear as Justice Stevens and the majority interprets it. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 
1486; Gonzales, 484 F.3d at 715; Garcia-Echaverria, 376 F.3d at 512. 
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2. Inadmissibility 
 While a conviction for a controlled substance may lead to removal 
from the United States, it might also lead to future inadmissibility.81 In 
comparing the INA’s inadmissibility provision with its removal provi-
sion, one should notice that a conviction is not needed to render one 
inadmissible to the United States.82 Rather, a mere admission of the 
essential elements of a controlled substances conviction is enough to 
trigger inadmissibility.83  One should also notice that, unlike the re-
                                                                                                                      
 
81 See Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2002). As part of the broad structural 
changes to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Congress 
“dropped the concept of ‘excludability’ and now uses the defined term of ‘inadmissibil-
ity.’” Id. One inadmissibility controlled substance provision provides: 
Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having 
committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential 
elements of . . . 
(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation 
of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled sub-
stance (as defined in the [Controlled Substances Act]), 
is inadmissible. 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). 
82 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (not requiring conviction for inadmissibility), 
with Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (including aliens convicted of a controlled substance violation 
in list of deportable classes). 
83 See Id. § 1182(a)(2)(C). The statutory provision directly references inadmissibility 
of controlled substance traffickers: 
Any alien who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has rea-
son to believe— 
(i) is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or in any 
listed chemical(as defined in section 802 of title 21), or is or has been a 
knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in il-
licit trafficking in any such controlled or listed substance or chemical, or 
endeavored to do so; or 
(ii) is the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien inadmissible under clause(i), 
has, within the previous 5 years, obtained any financial or other benefit 
from the illicit activity of that alien, and knew or reasonably should have 
known that the financial or other benefit was the product of such illicit ac-
tivity, 
is inadmissible. 
Id; cf. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii). Under the removal statute, aliens that are drug abusers or 
addicts are also subject to removal on those grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii). The 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has developed a three part test to determine whether 
an admission has occurred: (1) “the admitted conduct must constitute the essential ele-
ments of a crime . . . . ;” (2) “the applicant for admission must have been provided with 
the definition and essential elements of the crime prior to his admission . . . . ;” and (3) 
“[the] admission must have been voluntary.” See Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209, 
1215–16 (9th Cir. 2002). It should be noted that this admission is different from the term 
used in the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A); Pazcoguin, 292 F.3d at 1215–16. Further-
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moval provision, there is no exception to the inadmissibility provision 
for possessing thirty grams or less of marijuana for personal use, but 
one may potentially qualify for a “212(h) waiver.”84 As such, Padilla’s 
guilty plea to counts 1 through 3 of his indictment would render him 
subject to removal and inadmissible to the United States in the future.85 
C. The Client’s Wishes and Plans for the Near Future 
 Under the stricter rules of competence, a criminal defense attor-
ney should determine the client’s wishes and plans for the near future 
regarding United States residency.86 For example, while the criminal 
defense attorney might believe that the client’s objective is to avoid in-
carceration, sometimes removal from or inadmissibility into the United 
States is actually the client’s paramount concern.87 Therefore, an alien 
might prefer incarceration if that option could salvage his or her immi-
gration status.88 If the client wishes to remain in the United States, 
however, the criminal defense attorney must explain the immigration 
consequences of a plea—other than just the certainty of removal— in-
cluding but not limited to: (1) mandatory detention, (2) travel restric-
tions, and (3) naturalization.89 Alternatively, criminal defense attorneys 
may also need to consider the possibility that the client would prefer 
removal over incarceration.90 
                                                                                                                      
more, this provision would arguably trigger the Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). 
84 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A), 1182(h), 1227(a)(2)(B). The term “212(h) waiver” 
corresponds to its INA provision and is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
85  See Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 47; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A), 
1227(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
86 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2011). 
87 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480. 
88 See id. 
89 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (detailing situations when the Attorney General shall take 
into custody inadmissible or deportable aliens); Id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (allowing a lawful 
permanent resident alien to be regarded as seeking admissions to the United States if they 
are inadmissible to the United States for having committed an offense under section 
1182(a)(2)); Id. § 1101(a)(23) (defining naturalization as “the conferring of nationality of 
a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever”). 
90 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480. The lawyer should be careful and inquire into the rea-
sons for the alien wanting to leave the United States because the client might be planning 
to return without documentation after having been deported. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326. This is a 
federal crime. Id. The attorney needs also to advise the client of the criminal and immigra-
tion ramifications of returning after having been deported. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480; 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2.1. Additionally, the client might want to be re-
moved or self-deport in an effort to avoid criminal liability. Of course, the attorney cannot 
encourage the client to evade the law. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(c). 
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1. Mandatory Detention 
 Mandatory detention is a significant immigration consequence 
that must be taken into consideration with any proposed plea of crimi-
nal guilt.91 While the Padilla majority noted that defense counsel must 
notify the defendant of deportation when its threat is truly clear, the 
Court should have specifically identified potential mandatory deten-
tion as another area worthy of notice.92 In pertinent part, the INA pro-
vides that: 
The attorney general shall take into custody any alien who— 
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense 
covered in section 1182 (a)(2) of this title [(inadmissibility for 
controlled substances)], [or] 
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense 
covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) [(multiple criminal con-
victions)], (A)(iii) [(aggravated felony)], (B) [(controlled 
substances)], (C) [(certain firearm offenses)], or (D) [(mis-
cellaneous crimes)] of this title . . . .93 
 If Padilla were to fall within this statute, he would be detained 
without bond eligibility pursuant to the INA.94 This period of custody 
would last for the pendency of the immigration removal proceeding, 
which usually begins after any criminal sentence is served.95 Further, if 
Padilla had decided to present an immigration defense, he should also 
have been advised that he would likely remain in an immigration jail 
without bond until the trial’s completion.96 Alternatively, if he acqui-
                                                                                                                      
91 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006). 
92 See id.; Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
93 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). 
94 See id. §§ 1226(c)(1), 1231(a)(2); Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 48. 
95 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). “[W]hen an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General 
shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section 
referred to as the ‘removal period’).” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The mandatory detention pe-
riod referenced here is the time prior to an order signed by an immigration judge. See id. 
§ 1226(a). During the pendency of the removal proceedings the attorney general arguably 
does not have jurisdiction to issue a bond. Some studies report that the average wait time 
in the United States for an immigration case to be brought to trial is almost five hundred 
days. See Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigration 
Courts, TRAC Immigr. ( July 26, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_ 
backlog. Immigration removal proceedings are generally referred to as Section 240 pro-
ceedings. See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. However, the Service can choose to remove an 
Alien prior to the completion of the criminal sentence under limited situations. Id. 
§ 1231(a)(4)(B). 
96 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1), 1231(a)(2); Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 48. 
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esced to deportation, the time of incarceration in an immigration jail 
would be reduced, but he would be subsequently inadmissible to the 
United States.97 
2. Travel Restrictions 
 While a single conviction for possession of less than thirty grams of 
marijuana would not result in removal, such a conviction could result 
in future inadmissibility should an alien leave and then attempt to re-
turn to the United States.98 As such, if Padilla fell within the marijuana 
provision of the INA and, by virtue of possessing less than thirty grams, 
fell outside of the removal statute, his criminal defense counsel would 
have needed to advise him about his future inadmissibility. 99 
3. Naturalization 
 To qualify for United States naturalization, an applicant must pos-
sess good moral character for the applicable statutory period.100 The 
INA does not define “good moral character” and instead provides a 
categorical list of circumstances where an individual would show a lack 
of good moral character.101 For instance, if an alien is inadmissible to 
the United States due to a conviction relating to a controlled substance, 
has been incarcerated for 180 days or more, or was convicted of an ag-
gravated felony, that person would lack good moral character and be 
incapable of naturalization.102 
                                                                                                                      
97 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
98 See id. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(1), 1227(A)(2)(B)(ii). A lawful permanent resident alien 
can be regarded as inadmissible to the United States for having committed an offense 
under INA section 212. See id. §§ 1101(a)(3), 1101(a)(20), 1182(a)(2). 
99 See id. §§ 1101(a)(3), 1101(a)(20), 1182(a)(2). For example, in People v. Garcia, the 
Department of Homeland Security arrested a permanent resident alien after he returned 
from a trip abroad for having a previous controlled substance conviction. 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 
400–401 (Sup. Ct. 2010). He, however, had not been deported prior to leaving the coun-
try. See id. at 399–400. The court found Padilla retroactive and reopened the conviction 
despite the attorney’s immigration warning and the court’s admonishments. Id. at 404. 
100 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (defining naturalization as “the 
conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever”). 
The statutory period differs depending on the statute used to seek naturalization. Compare 
id. § 1427(a) (“No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be natu-
ralized unless such applicant . . . has resided continuously . . . within the United States 
for at least five years . . . .”), with id. § 1430(a) (requiring only three years of residence 
for a person whose spouse is a citizen or who is a spouse or child of a citizen who battered 
him or her). 
101 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), 1427(a). 
102 See id. § 1101(f)(3), (7), (8). 
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 For naturalization purposes, the INA indicates that if Padilla had 
pled guilty to an aggravated felony, he would be permanently ineligible 
for naturalization.103 If, however, he had pled guilty to a lesser offense 
not classified as an aggravated felony, he would merely lack the requi-
site good moral character for the duration of the statutory period, after 
which he could be eligible for naturalization.104 
D. Criminal Trial Strategy 
 An alien charged with a crime involving controlled substances will 
likely consider the immigration consequences of a conviction in decid-
ing whether or not to plead guilty or proceed to trial.105 While an alien 
might be legally subject to removal, that person might also be eligible 
to apply for protection from removal upon meeting the applicable 
statutory relief requirements and meriting a favorable exercise of dis-
cretion.106 The circumstances surrounding Padilla’s case present the 
following potential avenues of immigration relief: (1) adjustment of 
status; (2) waivers of inadmissibility; and (3) invoking the Convention 
Against Torture.107 
1. Adjustment of Status 
 In general, adjustment of status is a procedural vehicle whereby 
the Attorney General may, at his or her discretion, adjust the status of 
an approved Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) self-petitioner or of 
an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United 
States.108 Adjustment of status is generally not available to one with a 
                                                                                                                      
 
103 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) (2006). This only applies where the conviction was entered 
on or after November 29, 1990. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 509, 104 
Stat. 4978 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101); Reyes, 20 I. & N. Dec. 789, 790 (Bd. of 
Immigration Appeals Apr. 28, 1994). 
104 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3), (7). 
105 See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 612 (9th Cir. 1999); Attila Bogdan, Guilty 
Pleas by Non-Citizens in Illinois: Immigration Consequences Reconsidered, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 19, 
19 n.4; see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1480. 
106 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A). 
107  See id. §§ 1255(a), 1182(h), 1229b(a); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477–78; 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.17(a) (2010). 
108  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(51) (defining “VAWA self-
petitioner”). The statute provides: 
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the 
United States or the status of any other alien having an approved petition for 
classification as a VAWA self-petitioner may be adjusted by the Attorney Gen-
eral, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that 
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controlled substance conviction because that person is inadmissible to 
the United States.109 A waiver, however, could be available to cure the 
ground of inadmissibility where the alien is convicted of possession of 
less than thirty grams of marijuana.110 Individuals in nonimmigrant visa 
classifications S, T, and U could possibly adjust their status regardless of 
their criminal convictions. 111 
2. Certain Waivers 
 Individuals subject to deportation or who are inadmissible to the 
United States may nevertheless be eligible for certain waivers, thereby 
curing that status.112 While a discussion of all possible waivers is beyond 
the scope of this Article, at least two types of waivers should be consid-
ered: (1) The INA § 212(h) waiver and (2) the INA § 240A waiver, 
which is the modern day version of the INA § 212(c) cancellation of 
removal.113 
                                                                                                                      
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes 
an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an im-
migrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, 
and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his ap-
plication is filed. 
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
109 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i), 1255(a)(2). A conviction for a crime classified as 
an aggravated felony, standing alone, does not render one ineligible for adjustment be-
cause an aggravated felony is a ground of removal and not a ground of inadmissibility. See 
Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 80, 87 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals May 9, 2001). 
110See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006); Barraza, 519 F.3d at 393. 
111 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(j), (l)–(m); see also  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S), (T), (U). Indi-
viduals granted S visas can adjust their status without regard to their criminal convictions. 
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(S), 1255(j). 
112 See id. §§ 1182(h), 1229b(a). 
113 See id. §§ 1182(h), 1229b(a). On the matter of cancellation of removal, the INA 
states: 
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is in-
admissible or deportable from the United States if the alien— 
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not 
less than 5 years, 
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having 
been admitted in any status, and 
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). 
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a. The INA § 212(h) Waiver 
 Aliens inadmissible to the United States for crimes involving moral 
turpitude, for having multiple criminal convictions, or for controlled 
substance convictions insofar as they relate to a single offense of simple 
possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana may be eligible for an 
inadmissibility waiver. 114  The INA § 212(h) waiver is relevant to 
                                                                                                                      
 
114 See id. § 1182(h). The BIA defines a crime involving moral turpitude as “conduct 
which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality 
. . . .” Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (Bd. of Immigration Appeals Sept. 13, 1994). 
The INA § 212(h) Waiver reads: 
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of sub-
paragraphs (A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) of subsection (a)(2) of this section 
and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single 
offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana if— 
(1)(A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of 
the Attorney General that— 
(i) the alien is inadmissible only under subparagraph (D)(i) or 
(D)(ii) of such subsection or the activities for which the alien is 
inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the 
alien’s application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status, 
(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not 
be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the 
United States, and 
(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or 
(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daugh-
ter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney 
General that the alien’s denial of admission would result in extreme 
hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, 
son, or daughter of such alien; or 
(C) the alien is a VAWA self-petitioner; and 
(2) the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, 
conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has con-
sented to the alien’s applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the 
United States, or adjustment of status. 
No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of an alien who 
has been convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts that constitute) 
murder or criminal acts involving torture, or an attempt or conspiracy to 
commit murder or a criminal act involving torture. No waiver shall be 
granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been 
admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been con-
victed of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continu-
ously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately 
preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the 
United States. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the At-
torney General to grant or deny a waiver under this subsection. 
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Padilla’s predicament because it is one possible strategy to cure inad-
missibility following his conviction for possession of less than thirty 
grams of marijuana—count 1 of his indictment—or for possessing drug 
paraphernalia—count 2 of his indictment.115 The INA § 212(h) waiver, 
however, will not necessarily cure Padilla’s aggravated felony controlled 
substance conviction for trafficking in marijuana.116 
b. The INA § 212(c) Waiver and Cancellation of Removal 
 The INA § 212(c) waiver had its beginnings in the “Seventh Pro-
viso” of the 1917 INA.117 The waiver is important because it can possibly 
cure grounds of removal for aliens who are considered aggravated fel-
ons.118 In 1996, however, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act severely curtailed INA § 212(c) by precluding relief for aliens with 
convictions for controlled substances.119 On April 1, 1997, the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act repealed INA 
§ 212(c) and replaced it with an entirely different form of relief, which 
is commonly referred to as cancellation of removal.120 
 Despite its repeal, the waiver continues to be available to those 
aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and 
who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for 
                                                                                                                      
8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). An alien with two or more convictions who has served an aggregate of 
five or more years in confinement as a result thereof is inadmissible. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(B). 
The pertinent statute reads: 
Any alien convicted of 2 or more offenses (other than purely political of-
fenses) regardless of whether the conviction was in a single trial or whether 
the offenses arose from a single scheme of misconduct and regardless of 
whether the offenses involved moral turpitude, for which the aggregate sen-
tences to confinement were 5 years or more is inadmissible. 
Id. 
115 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h); Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 48. 
116 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006) (“No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in 
the case of an alien [who] has been convicted of an aggravated felony . . . .”); Joint Ap-
pendix, supra note 19, at 48. 
117 See INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed Sept. 30, 1996); Immigra-
tion Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 878 (“That aliens returning after a temporary ab-
sence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven consecutive years may be ad-
mitted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, and under such conditions as he may 
prescribe . . . .”). 
118 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed Sept. 30, 1996). 
119 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§ 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (1996); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed Sept. 30, 1996). 
120 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587, 3009-594 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) 
(2006)). 
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INA § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the laws then in ef-
fect.121 Unfortunately for Padilla, the law in effect at the time of his 
conviction did not allow for the INA § 212(c) waiver or cancellation of 
removal for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies.122 
3. The Convention Against Torture 
 Pursuant to the CAT, applicants must prove that it is more likely 
than not that they will be subject to torture upon returning to a native 
country and that such torture will be instigated by “or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.”123 Under CAT, one’s criminal history or convictions for ag-
gravated felonies or controlled substances would not preclude relief 
from removal.124 
4. Sanitize the Record 
 The INA places a burden on the government to establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien admitted to the 
United States, the alien is deportable.125 Therefore, a possible immigra-
tion defense strategy might be to sanitize the criminal court record and 
make the prosecutor unable to carry the burden of proof.126 Count 1 of 
Padilla’s indictment alleged that, at the time of arrest, he possessed an 
unknown amount of marijuana.127 As such, a possible strategy would be 
to plead guilty to Count 1 only for possession of marijuana and to docu-
ment in the court record or plea colloquy that Padilla was said to have 
possessed less than thirty grams of marijuana, thereby avoiding aggra-
                                                                                                                      
121 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325, n.55 (2001). 
122 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed Sept. 30, 1996); Joint Appendix, supra note 
19, at 49. 
123 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1) (2010). 
124 See id. § 1208.16(d)(2). Mandatory denials under the Convention Against Torture are 
described in the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(3) for excep-
tions to the mandatory denials. If the alien has committed a particularly serious crime or an 
aggravated felony for which the term of imprisonment is at least five years, only deferral—not 
withholding—of removal is authorized. Id. §§ 1208.16(d)(3), 1208.17(a). 
125 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2006). 
126 See Jorge L. Barón & Alix Walmsley, A Brief Guide to Representing Nonciti-
zen Criminal Defendants in Connecticut 9 (2005), available at http://www.immigrant 
defenseproject.org/docs/fileU.pdf. 
127 Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 48. Count 4 of the grand jury indictment, how-
ever, discloses that officers caught Padilla trafficking in 1033 pounds of marijuana and, 
therefore, this strategy’s ultimate success depends on the prosecution’s willingness to drop 
the trafficking charges. 
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vated felon classification and preventing removal. 128  Then, Padilla 
would only need to stay in the United States while establishing good 
moral character to avoid triggering the INA’s inadmissibility provi-
sion.129 
III. The Author’s Criticism of the Padilla Majority and 
Proposed Resolution 
 The Padilla majority correctly held that deportation is intimately 
related to the criminal process and that advice about immigration con-
sequences of a criminal conviction fall within the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.130 While the entire 
Court recognized that immigration is complex and, to a certain extent, 
that attorney misadvice is always inappropriate, the Padilla majority de-
termined that it was constitutionally acceptable to expect the criminal 
defense attorney to have a duty to advise only when the deportation 
consequences to a conviction were truly clear.131 The Supreme Court’s 
reasoning, however, is circular in that a criminal attorney must often 
study to determine what is truly clear in the first instance. Further, the 
do-no-more directive arguably fosters a lower standard of professional 
                                                                                                                      
128 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (establishing possession of thirty grams or less of mari-
juana as an exception to the inadmissibility provision of § 1182(a)(2)(C)); Padilla, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1477–78; Barón & Walmsley, supra note 126, at 9. 
129 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), 1182(a)(2)(C). 
130 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (noting that the Court has 
“never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the 
scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under Strickland,” 
and that the “law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for 
nearly a century”). 
131 Id. at 1483; see also id. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court’s new approach is 
particularly problematic because providing advice on whether a conviction for a particular 
offense will make an alien removable is often quite complex.”). Both the concurring opin-
ion and dissenting opinion agreed with the majority that an attorney should not be per-
mitted to provide misadvice regarding immigration consequences. See id. at 1482–83 (ma-
jority opinion); id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I concur in judgment because a 
criminal defense attorney fails to provide effective assistance within the meaning of Strick-
land v. Washington . . . if the attorney misleads a noncitizen client . . . .”); id. at 1494 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplat-
ing a guilty plea ought to be advised of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, 
and surely ought not to be misadvised.”); see also Nina Totenberg, High Court: Lawyers Must 
Give Immigration Advice, NPR (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyId=125420249 (“In clear cases, a lawyer must advise his or her client that the 
guilty plea triggers automatic deportation. In less clear cases, the lawyer must still advise 
that an immigrant’s status could be in jeopardy.”). 
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responsibility, in turn violating the alien client’s Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel.132 
 In Padilla, Justice Stevens found the defendant’s potential immi-
gration consequences clear, stating that “Padilla’s counsel could have 
easily determined that his plea would make him eligible for deporta-
tion simply from reading the text of the statute . . . . ”133 The statute 
cited by the majority, in relevant part, states: 
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted 
of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law 
or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign coun-
try relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a sin-
gle offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams 
or less of marijuana, is deportable.134 
 As this Article demonstrates, however, the above controlled sub-
stance statute is not as clear as Justice Stevens describes it.135 Before 
even turning to the statute, criminal counsel would first need to deter-
mine Padilla’s immigration status and United States citizenship prior to 
discerning whether the Kentucky state statutes—under which prosecu-
tors charged Padilla—fit within the federal controlled substances im-
migration statute for removal.136 Padilla’s counsel would also need to 
determine whether he had been at any point: (1) admitted to the 
United States, (2) convicted in the United States or a foreign country, 
and (3) convicted in relation to a controlled substance other than a 
single offense involving possession of thirty grams or less of mari-
juana.137 Moreover, counsel would need to investigate Padilla’s wishes 
and future goals, such as staying in the United States or avoiding incar-
ceration, to develop a strategy geared toward those priorities.138 
 In his concurrence in Padilla, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts, agreed with the majority that Strickland applies.139 Justice Alito 
argued, however, that a client’s attorney, even where the immigration 
consequences to a guilty plea may be truly clear, may simply tell the cli-
ent to hire an immigration attorney if the client wants to know any im-
                                                                                                                      
132 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (majority opinion). 
133 See id. 
134 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
135 See id.; Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
136 See Barón & Walmsley, supra note 126, at 8. 
137 See id. at 10–14. 
138 See id. at 8–9. 
139 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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migration consequences.140  The concurring opinion is reasonable— 
though, not ideal—where a privately retained attorney is involved at the 
outset of the representation.141 The concurring opinion, however, is 
not constitutionally reasonable where the client does not give informed 
consent at the outset of representation to hire an additional immigra-
tion attorney; this is also the case for aliens represented by public de-
fenders.142 When a defendant must financially qualify for a public de-
fender or an appointed attorney, he or she will likely not be able to 
secure an immigration attorney.143 
A. Requiring Study for Private and Appointed Defenders 
 A private or appointed attorney should be forced to study the law 
without limitation to determine what is “truly clear” because the clients 
expect this service. While study may afford the attorney opportunity to 
give incorrect or incomplete advice, private and appointed attorneys 
should not accept clients if they are unfamiliar with cr-immigration law 
or will not become competent shortly thereafter. 144  This rationale, 
                                                                                                                      
140 Id. at 1487. 
141 See id. The Court, in its truly-clear reasoning, should not have quoted from the con-
trolled substance statute, but instead, to the aggravated felony statute which states: “The 
term ‘aggravated felony’ means . . . (B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . , 
including a drug trafficking crime . . . .”8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006); see Padilla, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1483 (majority opinion) (“The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be deter-
mined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, 
and his counsel’s advice was incorrect.”). While the Court was correct because Padilla 
could likely be removed from the United States under the controlled substances statute, 
the illicit trafficking statute would have constituted an aggravated felony and could have 
led to a much quicker decision on deportation. This would have led to a precedential de-
cision from the Sixth Circuit, which had motivation to equate the Kentucky marijuana 
trafficking statute with the INA’s aggravated felony statute for illicit trafficking. See Garcia-
Echaverria v. U.S., 376 F.3d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 2004). 
142 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1, 1.4 (2011). 
143 See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1), (g)(2) (2006). The term “appointed attorney” is dis-
tinguished from the term “public defender” in that the appointed attorney is a private 
attorney who is part of a panel of attorneys paid an hourly rate to represent the accused by 
the government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. This is different from a federal public 
defender or an assistant federal public defender, who cannot engage in the private prac-
tice of law by statute. See id. § 3006A(b), (d)(1), (g)(2). 
144 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1, 1.3, 2.1. For 
example, an attorney might study and advise an alien client that deportation is certain but 
may not give complete advice because, unbeknownst to the attorney, immigration relief is 
available. The result, therefore, may be an unnecessary criminal trial when a simple guilty 
plea and subsequent immigration relief—such as cancellation of removal—would have 
been sufficient. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1, 
1.3, 2.1. 
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based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, serves as a 
guide to what is constitutionally reasonable.145 
 The truly-clear standard allows private practitioners to opt out of 
fulfilling the duties they owe to their clients, and therefore, should be 
against public policy.146 Basic contract law allows an attorney and an 
alien defendant to enter into a contract for legal services but voids the 
contract where it is against public policy.147 Therefore, when an attor-
ney signs a contract for what the client believes to be all-inclusive legal 
services but does not actually need to perform to the client’s expecta-
tions, the contract should be void. 
 The attorney should only be able to limit the scope of representa-
tion when reasonable under the circumstances and if the client gives 
informed consent.148 In Padilla, however, allowing a private attorney to 
represent Padilla for criminal matters but not the associated immigra-
tion matters was not reasonable under the circumstances. Simply put, it 
is unreasonable to presume that any client would consent to an attor-
ney keeping a fee without providing a service. 
B. Lowering the Study Standard for Public Defenders 
 The Padilla majority references the differing duties of attorneys by 
stating that “[t]he duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more 
limited.”149 The Court, however, erred in its statement and should have 
distinguished between private, appointed, and public defenders. Thus, 
the private and appointed defenders must not limit their duties, but the 
public defenders should do no more than advise of potential immigra-
tion effects.150 
 Although private and appointed attorneys may control their 
caseloads, public defenders cannot, and therefore, they should be ex-
                                                                                                                      
145 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1, 1.3, 2.1. 
146 See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law-
yers § 54(2) (2000) (“An agreement prospectively limiting a lawyer’s liability to a client 
for malpractice is unenforceable.”). 
147 See Richard A. Lord, Illegal Agreements and Agreements Against Public Policy, Willis-
ton on Contracts § 12:1 (4th ed. 2009); Friedman v. Hartmann, 787 F. Supp. 411, 421 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (deciding an alleged agreement to indemnify for intentional misconduct, 
the court said: “Under the law of Connecticut, as elsewhere, contracts contrary to public 
policy are void and unenforceable . . . . It is well established that contracts providing for 
indemnity for losses incurred as a result of intentional misconduct are void and unen-
forceable as against public policy.”). 
148 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(c). 
149 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
150 But see id. 
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empt from the constitutional duty of determining what is truly clear.151 
Under the existing standard, public defenders must diligently study 
immigration law for each client and may not be able to effectively serve 
everyone.152 Adhering to this rule overworks them because having too 
many cases is not a recognized excuse for violating ethical obligations.153 
 The public defender should not, however, be permitted to limit 
the representation—thereby avoiding the practice of immigration 
law—under all circumstances.154 Strickland v. Washington simply requires 
that the attorney perform reasonably under the circumstances.155 It is 
not reasonable under the circumstances to expect public defenders—
who cannot control their dockets—to study immigration law and de-
termine what is “truly clear.” There is a high likelihood that immigra-
tion law studies would interfere with the public defender’s duties to 
existing criminal clients that do not also have immigration issues. 
 Public defenders are already burdened by their immense duties, 
such that also learning immigration law should be unnecessary. For ex-
ample, in State v. Peart, the court found that one public defender had, 
over a seven month period, represented 418 clients—including 130 
guilty pleas at arraignment— “had at least one serious case set for trial 
for every available trial date during that period,” received minimal inves-
tigative support, and had no funds for expert witnesses.156 Therefore, 
the public defender “was not able to provide his clients with reasonably 
effective assistance of counsel because of the conditions affecting his 
work, primarily the large number of cases assigned to him.”157 
 Instead of further burdening public defenders, courts should ap-
point immigration experts who are better suited to resolve these is-
sues.158 But, when a client privately retains an attorney, the court would 
not need to appoint an immigration expert because the private attorney 
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should either study or associate with a private immigration expert.159 
Likewise, appointed attorneys may hire immigration specialists and pay 
them up to eight hundred dollars without permission of the court.160 
C. The Fifth Amendment Direct-Collateral Distinction 
 No person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . .”161 Accordingly, Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 11 requires federal judges to determine whether a defendant’s 
guilty plea is entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 162  In 
Boykin v. Alabama, the Court’s ruling enshrined the Rule 11 protections 
as constitutional rights applicable to state criminal proceedings.163 
 The Supreme Court laid the foundation for a direct-collateral di-
chotomy in Brady v. United States, which required criminal tribunals to 
accept guilty pleas only from defendants who are “‘fully aware of the 
direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments 
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel . . . .’”164 
Thus, the Court did not require a defendant’s awareness of all conse-
quences of a guilty plea nor did it define the term “direct conse-
quences.”165 
 The Padilla majority ruled that the direct-collateral dichotomy has 
no place in the Sixth Amendment but did not proscribe it from the 
Fifth Amendment.166 “‘It is clear that guilty pleas entered pursuant to 
bargaining must be entirely voluntary and that it is a violation of due 
process where such a plea is obtained by coercion or by deception or by 
a trick.’”167 
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Conclusion 
 In 1951, the Supreme Court recognized that deportation from the 
United States was the equivalent of banishment or exile. Fifty years 
later, in 2001, the Supreme Court acknowledged that aliens would want 
to know what immigration consequences they faced before pleading 
guilty. The landmark decision of Padilla v. Kentucky, coming nearly a 
decade later, finally shows that the Supreme Court recognizes that de-
portation is an integral part—indeed sometimes the most important 
part—of the penalty that might be imposed on noncitizen defendants 
who plead guilty to specified crimes. The Padilla Court, however, mis-
understood the intricacies of the boundaries between criminal and 
immigration laws, thereby setting the professional expectations of pri-
vate cr-immigration attorneys at an unnecessarily low level. 
 The Court only imposed a duty on the criminal defense attorney 
to advise when the immigration consequences of a conviction or plea 
are “truly clear.” Defense attorneys, however, need do no more when 
those consequences are not truly clear. Therefore, Padilla leaves defen-
dants pleading without knowing the likely consequences of their ac-
tions. Furthermore, the decision acts to overburden public defenders 
while allowing private and appointed attorneys to opt out of duties to 
their clients. Under the circumstances, Padilla v. Kentucky erroneously 
excuses fundamental fairness and leaves professional responsibility lost. 
